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QI!TTINQ UNSTRUCK ON STATUS• 
The Politics of Decolonialization 
Pedro A. Caban 
In December 1988, he (Governor Rafael HenWldez Col6n) skipped the year~nd fiestas 
that fill Pueno Rican plazas to stroll alone on the Scottish moors and contemplare the 
narrowness of his ~Ill re~lection. 
There he reached a ~ decision: to call for a plebiscite (oow set for 1991) 
to decide wbelbel' Puerto Rico sOOuld declare independence, become the S 1st. stale, or 
retain albeit in a more prtcisely defined and updaft4 form -its singular status as a 
Commonwealth. 
Alan Weisman. "An Islml in Limbo," 
New York Tunes Magazine Section. February 18, 1990 
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has always been an incomplete and unsatisfactory political creation 
which even its creator, the Partido Pop.WU Democrdtico (PPD) has sought to amend almost from the momeru of 
its creation. Ever siru 19SO, when C~ authorized the insular administtation in Pueno Rico to draft a 
constitution and establish a republican form of local govenunent. the Commonwealth relation has been con-
demned by independence and swehood forces for obscuring and legitimizing Pueno Rico's actual colonial 
status. However, until oow, Congress has ignored almost four decades of continuous effons by Pueno Ricans 
from all political sectors to rework the colonial formula. 
Govcmor Hemmlez Col6n may have prevailed upon his supponers in Congress to initiate referendwn 
related legislation. yet. ~' unamapated willingness to accede to this request suggestS that, finally. the 
political and ecommic conditions an: conducive for a change in the colonial relationship. 
In cmttast to the popdady held view quoud above, this paper examines the proposed refcrendwn • a 
hislorical process and • the ouu:ome of an onaoma crisis of colonial managemett. The emergence of a more 
stable regional geo-political environlned aiXl new forms of produaion by multinational finns have resultt4 in the 
erosioo of the prevailing Commmwealth (or the Estado Ubre Asociado in Spanish) formula as a viable doctrine 
of imperial rule. The Commoowealth is an archaic form of colonial administration and legitimation that is no 
J.oo&er ccnsistent with the funaiooin& of Puerto Rico's amtemporary political canmy. 
The first section provides a brief overview of the various plebiscite initiatives, and examines these in the 
COI1IeXt of increased politi<:al party axnpetition since the la1e 1960s. It discusses the plebiscites in light of the 
electoral stralegies of the statehood aiXl Commonwealth parties. 
Secticn two discusses Pueno Rico's transformation from a light manufacturing center producing for U.S. 
marlcels no an export plalfonn for technologically advanced multinational corporations. And it examines how 
this transformation has affected the colonial state's management of the political economy. The next section 
COI1inues the economic analysis but focuses on the internationalization of Pueno Rico's economy and its 
changina role in the Caribbean region. It discusses the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and its relationship to an 
emergina resuucturaDon of the regional economy. 
The final section briefly examines the inlerplay of these diverse forces and developments, and discusses 
mw they have shaped the SlaiUS deliberations. The essay coocludes by suggesting that S.712 repn:seru the initial 
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stage in a decolonialization process leading to the eventual definition of Pueno Rico's political status, probably 
by the mid-1990s. 
THE POLffiCS OF THE PLEBISCITES 
The history and development of the Partido Popular Democratico (PPD) have been inexuicably tied to the 
political formula which now defines Puerto Rico-U.S. relations. The party and its founder, former Governor 
Munoz Marfn, were the intellectual architects and promoters of the Commonwealth. or Estado Ubre Asociado 
(ELA). However, during the last thirty-seven years the PPD has relentlessly sought to acquire more autooomous 
powers for FLA. It has soughl to demarcate the role of the federal government in the conduct of domestic affairs, 
and to define a role for Pueno Rico in in&emaaional commerce, trade and investment. Congress and the executive 
bnncb. dDigh. have been reluctant to tinker with the colonial arrangement. 
On March 23, 19S9,1ess than seven years after the proclamation ofELA. Puerto Rico's resident Commis-
sioner imoduced Jegislalion in Congress to alter and clarify Public Law 6(X)1 • But the persistem Congressional 
opposition to the implicit claim of sovereignry contained in the bill forced the PPD to substitute a substanlially 
revised bill in September 19S9. The new measure was subjeaed to intense Congressional scrutiny, detailed 
studies by executive branch agencies and wide-ranging debate in public hearings. The public hearings revealed 
the absence of consensus among Puerto Rico's political leadership on what type of changes stwld be effected in 
Puerto Rico's relationship with the U.S., which its government also opposed any changes in legislation that 
resttiaed the Constitutionally defined pmogatives of the federal govemmetll to regulate Puerto Rican affairs. 
After two years of legislative activity Congress failed to act on the measure, md it died quietly in early 1961. 
In the now famous 1962 radio message to the nation, Governor Muftoz Marin expressed his intention of 
promoting legislation that would provide for a "more perfect Commonwealth." On December3, 19621he PPD 
controlled legi.slarure enacted a joint-resolution calling upon Congress to initiate a process for a prompt settle-
ment of the status issue. Through its allies in Congress, three PPD formulated bills were introduced in the House 
and Senate. These measures called for creation of a joint U.S. - Puerto Rican Status Commission that would 
examine all areas of the Commonwealth relation, draft recommendations for perfecting a permanent union, and 
establish a procedure for implementing Pueno Rico's final political status. The proposed bill also required that 
Congress enact the Commissioo's recommendations concerning a plebiscite. 
The PPD's opporaiiS argued the bill was an unabashed partisan attempt by the PPD to legitimize a.A and to 
solidify its elcaoral base. Again. Congress rejected those items in the bill that constJained its legislative powers 
over Pueno Rico. It confined the Commission's task to an examination of all the factors concerning Puerto Rico-
U.S.Idalions. nl requiR:d it to draft a detailed repon. According to the Olairman of lhe House Subcommittee 
oo TerriiDrial and Insular Affairs. "this bill promises nothing more than a high level SlUdy." (Ad Hoc Advisory 
Group. 108). 
The U.S.-Pueno Rican Commission issued i1S report in 1966 and recommeOOed thal a plebiscite be held to 
.. establish the will of the citizens of Puerto Rico" in which all three status ~ons would be preseiUd. It also 
called for the establistment of jon U.S. Puerto Rican ad-OOc Commiuees to recommend further improvemenlS 
in the Commonwealth anangemem. or the transition measures to the other swus ~ons if approved in a 
plebiscite. Pursuad to this m:ommcndatioo. the PPD controlled legislature enacted the Political Status Plebiscite 
Lawof1966. 
The plebiscite was ~ld on July 23, 1967, despite a boycott by the Puerto Rican Independence Party and the 
Partido E.ctadista Republicano. A dissident faction of the PER. led by industrialist. Luis Ferre broke from the old 
starehood pany, and participated in the plebiscite as the United StateOOoders. Voter turnout w&41 unchmcteristi-
cally low, (6S.8 percent of the registered voter, about a 30 percent lower turnout than for the general elections). 
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Although.the Commonwealth o~ was approved by 60.5 percent of the voters, the PPD leadership had 
anticipated a larger perceruage of the vote. 
Yet. despite the flurry of plebiscite related activity, neither the PPD administration ofsmchez Vilella (1965-
1968) nor the Panido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) administration of Lufs Fern! ( 1969-1 m) established the ad-roc 
committees the Conunission had reconunended. In faa. coun action was brought against Governor Fern! to force 
him to comply with the Commission's recommendations. However, rather dWl authorizing a committee to study 
how ELA could be perfected, Fem established a committee to study the issue of the presidential vote for Puerto 
Rico. 
In 1973, the PPD renuned to power. and attempted to resurrect its cherished dreams for "perfecting the 
Commonwealth." On Sq:wnber 20, 1973 an Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Puerto Rico was jointly appointed by 
the President and the Governor of Puerto Rico. The Advisory Group was directed to develop the maximum of 
self-govemmena and self-detmnination within the framework of Commonwealth. and" recommend on the 
extent to which the swutory laws and administrative regulation of the United States apply." (Ad-Hoc Advisory 
Group, v). 
The Ad Hoc Advisory Group's repon ~released in October 1975 as the Compact of Permanent Union. It 
endorsed a tOOrough resuuauring of the colonial relatioosbip. It called for granting Pueno Rico the right to 
participate in iJVemaDonal organizalions. jurisdiction over cenain territories held by the United States, contto1 
over tariff and immigration policy, authority to enaer iNo commercial treaties, exem~om from Federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act. audxxity to regulate environmental quality standards, and other recommendations for 
increased autonomy. The Group also called on the President to endorse the Compact and to refer it to both Houses 
for Conglessional action. 
However, Presided Gerald Ford did not act on the recommendation. instead he proposed a statehood bill 
thal eventually died in Ccmmittee. In reaction to this. PPD President Commissioner Jaime Benitez drafted 
legisUDon panemed on the Ad Hoc Committee's general recommendations and which called for a plebiscite on 
swus. (Alegria Ortega, 179). Eight moruhs later. in August 1976, the House Subrommittee on Insular Affairs 
approved a revised version of the bill. However, after the PNP victories in 1976 and 1980. no further action was 
taken on the plebiscite bill of it died in Committee. 
After his defeat. ex~vemor HenWldez Col6n. recommited himself to the time honored tradition of 
perfecting the Commonwealth. His Nueva Tesis, released in 1978 argued that to confront the demands of the 
1980's Puerto Rico needs much ~r political autooomy over its "propia vida." He called for a munber of 
clmgcs in Public Law 600, in particular increased insular conuol over the political economy. La Nueva Tesis 
was patterned on the recommendations of the Compact of Permanent Union. The PPD was out of govemnent 
from 1976 through 1984 and was unable to promote its autonomous agenda. And while it conttollcd the 
governorship in 1984 duough 1987, the PPD kept its campaign promise of not making status an issue during its 
administration. 
However, in 1988 the swus issue returned with a vigor and urgency that has not been seen in Puerto Rico 
since the eady 19n. The Senate Committee on Fnergy and Natural Resources announced its ilmltion of 
drafting a status referaldum legislation and called upon the political leadership of the statehood. independence 
and Olmmonwealth par1ics to sutmit pmposals. 
The PPD's proposal for perfecting the Commonwealth reiteraled many of the provisiom coruined in La 
Nueva Tesis. Among the most significant provisions were limitations on the applicability of federal laws to 
Puerto Rico, expanding Puerto Rico's capacity to en&er into international agreements, and to pursue an indepen-
dem foreiBD policy, independeU Wi1f authority, control over immigration and jurisdiction over inteUcaual 
property. 
This latest request for increased autonomy met the same fare as all the earlier attempts, the Senate 
Committee rejec1ed sevateat of the twenty autonomy enhancing recommendations the PPD made. The PPD 
provisions were caregorically dismisstd because they were either inoonsislalt with the U.S. Constitution or 
implied an appropriation of the powers and prerogatives reserved for the executive branch. Stale Department 
repraemative Mary V. Mochary argued the enhanced Common- wealth proposal would create an tmpreeedenled 
political staiUS and·· ... would grar1 to Puerto Rico significant attriOOtes of sovereignty which would be incompat-
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ible with remaining pan of~ United States.'' The Depanmcd. *declared, objected to delegating Pueno Rico 
authority vested in the Executive Brandl by the Constitution and~ PPD 's proposal for Puerto Rico to enter into 
international agreanems was "most objectionable." Sbe leSti1ied as '"loog as Pueno Rico enjoys a status less than 
lhat of independence." it could mt gain ~r hedool to panicipare in inremational organizations than it is 
currently permitted. The Bush Administration reaffumed the Senale Commia.ee's opposition to "enhanced 
Commonwealdl." (Hearings). 
This brief overview reveals cenain consistencies in the history of status related activities. The PPD never 
envisioned the Commonwealth as permanent arrangemal. The Commonwealth oonce~ bridged the gap be-
tween the historically embedded annexationist and iOOependc:nce movemems. While the party had a solid 
political base, it also alti3Cted trose elemenrs of~ body politic that aspired to preserve Pueno Rico's cultural 
identity, 001 sougtu the security of close association with the U.S. On the other twld. independence fon:es, which 
during the 1~ were prominenl among the PPD's leadership ai¥1 intellectual cadres, were drawn to the PPD's 
political agenda because it held out the oope of evenrual emancipation. However, by the mid-1960s the PPD 
experienced serious internal challenges from the genuine autonomist sectors am was challenged by a rejuvenated 
am reconstructed statebood movc:mea 
The PPD's electoral success and ability to motilize durable political support from both sectors was based on 
the social benefits and eoooomic gmwdl associaled with ~ Estado Ubre Asociado. PPD suaregists were aware 
thal ELA severely ~cted the policy making powers of the government to regulate eronomic performance. 
They reasoned that the PPD's political longevity was based in pan on otnining the requisite autonomy from the 
federal govemmenl to regulate the changing domestic political ecommy. But its peodiar conception of "au-
tonomy" was to be achieved within the framework of common citizenship, common defense, common market 
am common currency. Thus, for the PPD politics of status has envisioned continued dependence on the U.S., 
enhanced oontroi over ecoromic activity ai¥1 the electoral prospects of the PPD as intimately relaled. 
The overview also indicates that Congress has coosistenlly refused to effect changes in the Commonwealth 
relation that compromised its authority to legislale over Pueno Rico am, in particular, it has rejected any 
language which implied bilaterality between Pueno Rico and Congress. Included in this is Congressional 
opposition to Pueno Rican claims of sovereignty. Congress also insisted on its prerogative to interpret the results 
of any plebiscite, and has viewed past plebiscites as indications of the electorate's preference that are not legally 
binding on Congress. Consistently administration officials have cautioned agaimt amending the Federal Rela-
tions Act because such changes would invariably ~in a derogation of the executive branch's constitutionally 
delegated powers. Fmally, the U.S. has rejeaed a role for the United Nations in any process involving a 
modification of Pueno Rico's political status. Oaiming not only that the resolution of Pueno Rico's status is a 
~y domestic matter, but that~ ''plebiscites" of 1952 and 1967 confonned to international staOOards on self-
determination. Congressional ai¥1 Administration reaction to the PPD proposals make it palpably clear that these 
concerns are still prevalent. 
Because EI...A ai¥1 the PPD are so intimately rel.ared, plebiscites, oowever, assume a different role in the 
context of increased political party competition. Invariably the plebiscite becomes a political event used by the 
PPD in an effort to erode~ statehood party's electoral prospects in forthcoming elections. Alternatively, the 
swdmd ai¥1 indepcmelx:e forteS take ~ opportunity to hammer tone the point that Pueno Rico is a colony 
whose people are victimized by second-class citizenship, and that ~ prevailing arrangemed is unworkable. 
Invariably the plebiscites debates become highly partisan ai¥1 heavily politicized episodes that focus on which 
status fonnula (which political party) will obtain lhe greaJ.esl material benefits to the society. 
In another paper, I argue that since the mid-196& the PPD has soughl to reassen its political hegemony by 
negotiating incre&4ied autooomous powers for the Commonwealth. (Cab4n. 1990). It recognized, in the early 
1960s that~ swus issue had acquired a new urgency, since~ PPD felt its continued political hegemony was 
contingent. in pan on wresting more autonomy ai¥1 support from the federal govenunent. However, the 1967 
plebiscite backfired, it intensified divisions widlin ~ PPD, fortified a younger and more sophisticated leadership 
in the.sw.ehood movcmem. and actually conttiOOU:d to the PPD's electoral defeat in 1968. Rather than demon-
strating irrefutable and deep-seated support for ~ Oxnmonwealth, the plebiscite raised the specter of a 
dimtisfied electorale thai wanted a new political leadership. 
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1be emergence and consolidation of the Partido Nuevo Progresista as a viable opposition fon::e has resulted 
in events unanticipated by the U.S. The federal govenunent has repeatedly declared that it will respect the wishes 
of the Puerto Rican for any option they favor. However, until recauly the U.S. has oot specified the conditions 
Wlder which it would do so. Congress, has ignored calls by Puerto Ricans that it is the responsibility of the U.S. 
to initiare a legitimate decolonialization process. It has been able to deflect these demands because, un1i1 1976, the 
statehood movement did not seem to pose a genuine threat to the hegemony of the PPD, notwithstanding the 
PNP's gubernatorial victory in 1968. Yet. subsequent PNP victories in 1976 and 1980, plus its extremely strong 
showing in the following two elections, has impressed Congress with the depdt and strength of armexationist 
sentiment. 
As long as the PPD was the dominant political party Congress did oot have to seriously contemplate 
stald1ood for Puerto Rico. Its long-standing commitmenl to awrove a swus change consistent with Puerto 
Ria> ·s wishes was a swement of principle dW few expected Congress would have to act on. But the wwuici-
pated vibrancy and durability of the PNP has shaken Congress from its quiescence, and forced it to deal with the 
consequences of gnnting statehood. These include the impact that increased federal uansfers will have on the 
naliona1 deficit. the c:onsc:qucnces of a sizeable Latioo blocX in Congress. and UIK:eltainty as to whether the 
nalkmli• and ~iOOependence forces would peacefully relinquish their cc:ntury-dd struggle for sovemJnlY. 
It is impon.an to emJNsize dlal elections in Puerto Ria> sOOuld oot be seen as popular mandales for a 
particuJar swus option. Since Congress has refused, until recently, to act seriously on the starus options, Puerto 
Ricans have conectly assumed that ELA wculd be oot be affected. irrespective of which pany came to power. 
Decisions by the electorate reflect its ~ms regarding which party can promote employmenl and sustain. or 
mcre.e, the infusions of pmlic capital from the United States. Nonetheless, given the peremial crisis of the 
insular ean>my, it is wttenable for Congress to dismiss the significance of the statehood movemenL 
11IE END OF BOOTSTRAP 
Efforts by Puerto Ricans to redefine the lemls of a>lonialism gained momentum during the mid-19605. But. 
the swus issue would have laid donnant had oot the PNP won the elections of 1968 and the ecooomy accelerated 
iiS IJduous and painful tnllSformation. The presumed linkage between status change and social well being has 
been• the core of the contliaual party system. In fact. the more vigorous efforts by the PPD and the PNP sino: 
the mid-19605 to alter the relations of a>lonialism a>incide with the exhaustion of the labor intensive industrial-
izatillo suategy and the res1JUClUring of Puerto Rico's economy. 
1be process of econcmic res1JUClUring was gradual. But by the late 1 ~ it was apparelll dW immediate 
acdoD by the Puerto Rican govemmeu was necessary to offset the social and eoonomic impact of Operation 
Boobtnp's unanticipaed demise. In 1968 the newly elected statehood government of Luis Fem was a>nfronted 
almost ftool the start with a profound crisis of economic management and deterioration in scx:ial cooliti~. The 
insular gove~D~lem amelionled the inlemity of this dislocation by quickly expaOOing public sector employmelll. 
by undenaldng an acce1elated pmgi3IIl of pmlic financed construction and by successfully lobbying the federal 
giMIIIIDt:U for more funds, (VIllamil). 
But by the end of the Fem administration it was clear that Puerto Rico's lraditional model of growth had rwt 
iiS c:oune. The PPD rebllned to power in 1 '172 after Puerto Rico had irretrievable lost its comparative advantage 
over labor a>sts. But even more unfortunate for PPD was that its raum roincided with the OP£C induced 
JeOtssim of the early 1~. Puerto Rim's economy was badly shaken and by the mid -1~ a series of 
ctisJocadons threatened social stability; oorpollfe profitability was under siege, investor confidence appeared to 
be evlp)l11ing,the Puerto Rican goverunert's budget deficits were WlSUstainable. its public debt had expanded 
to~ levels, its ability to generate capital fian the boOO markets was in jeopanly because of a rapidly 
detaioraling etedit rating, unemployment levels were in the mid 20 percent. and labor wtrest threa1ened vital 
public servica and production (Cabdn, 1989). 
Ooveroor 'Hctn6ndez ColOO reacted to this ~nted threat to ELA by calling for enhanced autonomy 
for the Commcnwealth, and by fonning a high-levd Committee to Study's Puerto Ria>'s Finances (the Tobin 
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Committce).The govenunent wanled ID rapidly reestablish Pueno Rico's once-vaunled inlemationally favorable 
invesuncn climate. The Tobin Committee's repon. in conjunction with the conclusions in the Compact of 
Penn~ Union, left liUle doubt that the colony was in trouble. Moreover, both studies painfully docwnented 
the limited powers lhal the Pueno Rican government had to effcaivdy manage the political ero~10111y. As a 
model for effective political administration and economic growth fl.A was in jeopardy of dissolving. 
The Tobin Committee's sobering conclusion was that Pueno Rico's government could resurrect a favorable 
investl'DCD climate only by providing more generous corporare subsidies and tax incentives. by exercising 
budgetary restraiN. and by increasing the revenue base and suppressing wage costs. In shon. a modified austerity 
paclcage panemcd along the lines of an International Monetary Fwxi st.abilization program was necessary, 
according to the Committee, to restore profitability and invesuneN.. 
As noted above, the Ford Administration rejected the PPD's request for increased policy making powers. 
However.ncarthec:ndofthePPD'sadministration in 1976, Congress did amend existing federal taxation in order 
to enccurage U.S. corporations to reinvest in Pueno Rico. The new tax regulation. koown as Seaion 936 of the 
1ntana1 Revalue Code appear to have been motivated by two ccn::ems. The U.S. Treasury Depanmerl wanted 
to ~ oorporalims in Pueno Ria> from ccnverting inlerest on Eurodollar deposits inlo possessions inrome, 
and dm avoiding federal taxes. UOOer previous legisl.aDon (Section 931 ), U.S. subsidiaries could repalriare 
earnings tax fn:e only upm liquidadon of their operalions. To discourage this pniCtice, and in faa to stimulale 
iilcJ'e.ed inveslmaiiS in the local eoonomy, Section 936 allowed tax free repatriation and provided a credit for 
ooo-business income {United States Department of the Treasury). 
Section 936 was also corresponded to the Puerto Rican govenuneru's suategy of attracting films with a 
higher capital to labor ralio. High labor costs had essentially knocked Pueno Rico out of the labor intensive export 
orieded marufacturing maJtet While ~ labor costs in Puerto Rico were partially a funaion of market 
antilka. they we~ also a function of the gradual phasing in of the federal minimum wage. Section 936 
atn.ud the more capital iltensive finDs that found Pueno Rico's cosas for s1cilled laborintemalionally competitive. 
Irooically, since the gap between remittances and invesunents increased after 1976 Section 936 appears to 
have bad the effect of accelerating the repatriation of profits and dividends to the U.S. (Edwin Melmkz, 1990, 
Dietz 1987). The new tax provisions advanced the transition to an economy in which multinational corporations 
appropriattd the dominarl role. When combined with the generous industrial incentives and subsidies, tax 
eltC'IIlpcioos and low wages, Section 936 convened Pueno Rico inlo an incredibly profitable investment site for 
multinadonal films. pu1iwlady iii the dearonics, pwmaceuticals and precision instruments sectors. The new 
tax law also fortified and expanded the •'maquiladora .. productive process thal was the linchpin of Pueno Rim's 
IDJilufacturin& sttategy during the 19S<M and 1~ (Panrojas, 1985). Multinational finns we~ increasingly 
usina Puerto Rioo u a manufacturing export enclave thal processed, assembled, tested and packaged inlenne-
diare and semi-mamfactured products. And by the mid-1980s Section 936 was directly ~ble for Pueno 
Rico's emergence • an importam center for finance and banking capital 
1bese firms weR highly mobile, with production sires throughout the world and relied on Pueno Rico not 
as maema1 production site for their global operaDcns, bit as a coovenieru locus through whidl IIley oould 
cblmd their excess capital. As James Dietz ha pointed out. .. ecor10111ic growth can be attributed in large 
IDeiSlft to 1 tnmferofvalue within an inlemational cilcuit of capital and within the struaure of the ilumadonal 
firm Ibm to 1 process of true productive growth of the island·s eoorony ... ( Dieaz, 1987-474) In short. Sedion 936 
set the institldionaJ. CXJnt.ext for the resuucturing of Pueno Rico ·s eoonomy into a high-tech and financial cater 
for the Caribbean. The implicalions of this cbange w~ to be acutely felt by the mid 1980s. 
This brief OYerYiew or chanFs in Puerto Rico's productive structure from the late-1 ~ through the mid-
1980s sugesas 111 erosion of the insular government's capacity to direct economic pelfonnance. Oearty, Section 
936 was 111 importmt filcal device that accelerated the transition to a higher stage of capitalist producDon. But. 
equally as impoltad w•the reliance on more sophisticated production processes and tedn>logies employed by 
1be multioational c:orponlioos. Aspects of modem capitalist production that are increasingly beyom the reach of 
nation staleS. let alone colonies. to regulate. 
But the essemal poim is that the federal government enacted special legislation to make Pueno Rico a more 
favorable site for capital aa:umulJlion without eilher altering the colonial status or granting enhanced policy-
matma powers to the insular government. When the new model of acaunulation failed to gencrare the expected 
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gains in employment or public revenues, the U.S. was compelled to increase its funding to the poverty stricken 
Island. 
The continued viability of ELA was the oomequence of the special tax provisions and related restructuring 
under the auspices of the multinational corporation. By the late 1970s a policy debale regarding the utility of the 
prevailing colonial relationship for capital accumulation and for preserving U.S. serurity interests in the region 
was underway in the executive branch. 
COLONIALISM UNDER CHALLENGE 
By the late 197~ the "isle of enchanunent" was proving to be financially draining, difficult to adminisaer 
and seemed to conuibule little to advancing the inrerest of the empire. Moreover, the matter of Pueno Rico's 
status persisaed in being an ilksome international issue (Pastor). 
The Carter Adrninistnlion undertook a high Jevd evaluation of the status situation, and was cautiously 
moving towald proposing a plebiscite, with independence as a viable option. (San Juan Star). But after his defeat. 
any notions about tinkering with the colonial formula~ abandoned by the Reagan administration. The United 
States was oot about to alter the colonial paradigm in what was at the time a volatile and politically Wl5table 
Can"bbean. Defeating the insurgents in El Salvador, destabilizing an evolving socialist system in Nicaragua. 
throUling CUban involvemem in Central America. solidifying Seaga' s regime in Jamaica. and suffocating the 
and-imperialist New Jewel Movement in Grenada were critical aims of the Reagan Caribbean policy. Within 
Pueno Rico, pro-imependence and nationalist forces came under renewed surveillance and attack. Political 
stability in Puerto Rico was crucial in this turbulent and changing region, and a plebiscite was out of the question. 
Despite the seeming lack of federal govenunent imerest during the SO's the academic and public policy 
communities generated an uncharacteristically volwnioous body of literature on Pueno Rico's relationship to the 
United States. The various analysis were vinually unifonn in identifying the prevailing political and economic 
ties as problematic at best and wtworkable at worse. They consistently raised doubts about the durability and 
efficacy of the Commonwealth status and the wisdom of preserving the Island's subordinate linkage to the United 
States. Implicitly these worts reinforced the notion that the political and economic costs of sustaining the Island's 
populalion and economic system are difficult to justify. While they did not assess the continued utility of 
colonialism for U.S. OOsiness, they emphasized the current phase of capitalist developmeru under colonialism 
was no longer as beneficial to either Puerto Rico or the United States as it was once. 
These studies not only sustained the Pueno Rican debate during the dry years of the Reagan administration. 
but provide evidence that the issue was important enough for substantial research funds to be clwmeled inlo think 
tanks and policy orielud sectors of academe. Yet. it appears that their direct impact on the Reagan administration 
was minimal. More inftuellial on the Administration's thinking about the Caribbean was the New Right. Its calls 
for a curious amalgam of Ol'dxxtox monetarism, neo-Keynesian militarism and me market principles. combined 
with its sword-rattlin& appeals for resurrecting lbe Cold War ideology and reassenin8 U.S. geo-political hege-
mony in Wesaem Hemisphere, formed the conceptual framewort for an aggressive interventionist posblre by the 
reawakened imperial swe. 
While lbe Reagan administration may have ignored Puerto Rico, the same canool be said for the Caribbean. 
On AugustS, 1983, then President Reagan signed the CanDbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. more popularly 
known as the Caribbean Basin Initiative. or the CBI. As originally proposed the CBI would have extended one-
way he trade.:> designated Caribbean nations. The regional development plan was originally intended to 
promoce labor inrmsive mamlfacturing with low capital ~enlS and may have drawn its inspiration from 
Puerto Rico's original Operation Bootstrap (Panlojas. 198S). While CBI did not realize its objectives of signifi-
caly increasing the value and volume of ttade between the U.S. and the Caribbean. it did stimulate the growth 
of textile and elearical equipnent expons from beneficiary countries to the United States <New Yort. Times. 
313/90). 
The CBI wa, in a very real way, a modem cold war variant of the Alliance for~. It was an effon to 
address the underlying causes of political instability by promoting a model of ecooomic growth based on 
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dependent capitalist developnent in which U.S. multinational corporations would acquire control of the dynamic 
sectors. And as was the case with the Alliance for Progress, the CBI had a decidedly militarist component. In the 
eoonomic shadows of CBI the Reagan administration promoted the coordination, modernization and regional 
integration of the iRiependent seauity and military apparatuses of the Caribbean nations. An economically 
dependent and militarily subservient Caribbean would be the best bulwark against the "exportation of revolution" 
from Cuba and Nicaragua. In this broader scheme Puerto Rico's could play an auxiliary, yet essential role. 
(Garda Muniz, Rodlfguez Beruft). 
1be statehood government of Romero Barcelo vociferously resisted the CBI initiative because it essentially 
eradicated the island's preferential access to U.S. markets md capital. h was nodling shon of ironic that the 
aggressive advocare of swehood was pleading for retaining key elemerus of the Foraker Act. that formative 
documenl thai codified Puerto Rico's secmingly eternal colonial starus. Partially in reaction to Romero's threat to 
lobby agaimt the CBilegislation. the Reagan administration made a major concession. It designated Pueno Rico 
a beneficiary of CBI by devising a special content requirement provision. This provision allowed Puerto Rican 
based indusUies to impon components and semi-manufactures for further processing and assembly in Puerto 
Rim. For its pan. Puerto Rico would make availaNe locaDy deposited profits of the 936 c.orporaliom for 
iDdusUial developned projeas in designated Caribbean nations. CBI had the pocential for advancing the 
instibltional and economic mgration of the Caribbean, with Puerto Rico oonceivably taking on a leade.Wp 
(almost sub-imperialist role) in the region. 
However, the most notable ac:comptinnent of the CBI is that it accelerar.ed a movement toward coordinated 
and imegraled production processes which linked Puerto Rico to other Caribbean nations. Maquiladora produc-
tion arrangemeu whidl were the halbnarts of Puerto Rico's Operation Bootstrap (see Panlojas, 1985) received 
a boost from the CBI. But the foals now was on Puerto Rico's role as an inlermediary promotional agent for U.S. 
multinalional corpora&ions in the Caribbean (Dietz 1990). Complementary plant production schemes linked the 
Caribbean economies to the U.S. markets through the value-added haven of Puerto Rico. The most sophisticated 
assembly, testing and packaging production phases were situated in Puerto Rico while other production sites in 
the Caribbean supplied the imermediare inputs manufactured by cheap labor. 
In the context of a more regionally based production netwo.X. in part stimulated by the CBI, the significance 
of FJ...A as· an institutional componem for regionally integrated multinational corpor.ue production declines. 
Puerto Rico does have a relaJ:ively well developed physical infrastructure, banking and finm:e capabilities and 
skilled managerial and labor force. Because of these anributes Puerto Rico can serve, according to business and 
pemment ~ves from the Caribbean, as an economic hub that could finance, ~ge and promote 
regionally based marufacnlring (SQII lllllll Star Nov 5, /989). However, these resource aUributes are not 
derivative nor contingent upon the preservation of the country's colonial status. 
CONCLUSIONS 
During the 19505 md 1 ~ PuQto Rico's colonial rdationship was critical in establishing favorable 
aotilims for foreign investmc:rt. Puerto Rico's unique characteristics of stable institutional order, proximity to 
U.S. markets. common currency and tariff, plus its cheap labor and combination of industtial incentives and 
emnptions provided fertile ground for the growth of labor intensive industrialization. Moreover, during the first 
decade of the post-war era it had functioned rdalively well as a mechanism for imperial administration. social 
legitimation and capital accumulation . But by the mid-1 ~ ocher small economies in Asia were aggressively 
expmding inlo Puerto Riro' s markets in the U.S. The gradual phasing in of federal minimum wage standards and 
tariff reductions. initialed during w Kennedy round, placed additional burdens on Pueno Rico's competitive-
ness. Pueno Rico's economy was becoming internationalized, open not only to the U.S. but increasingly to 
eaxx>mic forces operating al the globa11evel. 
11m. by the 1970s the very cornitions that were so significant for Operation Bootstrap, were increasingly 
anachronistic and secondary to the accumulation strategies of the multinational corporare sector. This tendency 
bas accelerared since the mid-198<B. A more mobile. integrared Rl expansive capital has defied the insular 
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governrned's traditional interventionist stralegy. The post-mid 1970s growth model has been acoompanied by 
high levels of unemployment. dangerously low labor participation rates. extensive envirorunerual damage and 
increased reliance on federal funds. Outmigration has also increased during the last five years. Technological 
advances in the productive forces (communications, information and data processing, intemalional talking, 
containerized shipping and organizational restructuring of the finn) continue to diminish the relevance of the 
Commonwealth formula as a key institutional prop for capitalist expansion. 
Indeed. Puerto Rico· s conuibution to regionally linked production 31¥1 trade currently does not derive from 
its unique attributes as a colonial possession. Radler its more prominent role in promoting complementary 
productioo facilities is a direct outgrowth of Section 936, Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act and the 
evolution of more sopuslicated produaion processes by multinational capital. 
However. this "new colonialism" is fraught with a novel set of coruradictions. The old colonialism, 
represen&ed by the ELA formula, COITeSpOilded to a particular historical period and stage of capitalist develop-
mentA stage in which U.S. government outflows were an essential component supporting an aggrasive, 
exp;mionisl phase of U.S. capital. The dollar was the top aurency, and U.S. capital was rapidly penetrating the 
closed marbls of the decimated European rolonial empires. The logic of communist COillainment justified 
virtually any act of imperial imerveUioo to proteCt the mrests of u.s. capital and the swe. 
But by 1he mid-1970s the foundations of U.S. global economic and political hegemony were eroding. 
Gradually the loog-established paradigm that fused the interests of transnational capital and the state iilo a 
unified vision of global dominance was tramformed. Policy makers realized thal the accumulation goals and 
strategies of umsnaDonal capital did oot neassarily redouOO to expansion of imperial state power. 
These considerations underlie the periodic but relatively persistent effons by the Treasury Depanrnent to 
chip away at SecUon 936, the linchpin of the modem Pueno Rican colony. The federal government is acutely 
aware of how importanl the Section 936 tax credit is to employment and investment in the Island, and koows that 
"a pwe out of Section 936 would cause economic dislocation in Pueno Rico." (Hearings, V 3, p. 20S) 
Nonetheless. in its annual repons on the "possessions corporation system of taxation," the Treaswy Department 
argues that Section 936 is a giveaway for the multinational corporations that results in billions of dollars in lost 
revenue for the federal government Since 1976, Treasury has periodically tried to persuade Congress to rescind 
the credit as a way of reducing the federal deficit Only because of a monumental lobbying effort by the PPD, its 
~allies and the Puerto Rico, U.S.A. Foundation was the Treasury's 1985 campaign to abolish the 
credit defeated. But T~ has, wilh its revenue enhancing allieS in Congress, enaa.ed measures thal have 
of&et the tax benefits of Section 936. 
~implications of this squabbling are theoretically significant It suggests that the federal government and 
capital are divided as to the benefits and costs of sustaining Puerto Rico as a colony. 
It is anytR 's guess whether the referendum will be held next year and according to the tenns of Senate Bill 
712. Numerous and elaborate scenarios as to the likely outcome of the legislative process proliferate in the media 
and the halls of power. The preceding pages idel1ify the domestic political and inlemational economic factors 
that may have mocivaed the U.S. to try and rework the colonial formula 
So far. the ~efermdum process has made it clear that the U.S. government is searching for an efficacious and 
ecaDDical arrmaanem ... will guanuu.e it UIJiatlictcd military access to Puerto Rico and I)RServe lhe vital 
eaiDDic mresas of U. S. finns.ln the process, the competing inlerests of different sectors of capital. the federal 
buaucracy.lbe Congress and Puerto Rico's political party leadership (wOOse participation, after an is rtqUired 
to lend a semblanoe oflegitimacy to the process), have all surfaced This has hindered the legislative process and 
confounded negotialions. 
The public hearings have revealed that. while the prevailing colonial formula is Wlworbble, the U.S. 
govertUDem has no inlention of revising the existing legislation to entwlce the autonomous powers of the 
Commonwealth. The sman money bets thal the referendwn will not be held in 1991 as spelled out in Senate Bill 
712. Udil now, the U.S. government has not been able to cJevise a formula thal is satisfactory to all tmse who 
have a Slake in Puerto Rico's political future. Unless the contlictinl array of demands is resolved. the U. S. would 
apparauly ralber keep its OObbled colony for now. But if we see lhe referendum as an initial response to economic 
arxt political t1111Sfonnaliom thal are eroding the viability of the Commonwealth, it is reasonable to expect dW 
Pueno Rico's stilUS will be ~fined sometime in this ceruury. 
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